Abstract
Introduction
Security protocols must satisfy important correctness requirements, which means that it is important to be able to think about them clearly and precisely. But they can also be large and complicated, which makes such reasoning difficult. One needs ways of decomposing the task into clearly separable pieces. This includes separating different types of concerns, for example, distributed algorithms issues, cryptosystem computability issues, probabilistic issues, and issues of accurate modeling of reality. It also includes decomposing the protocols using the normal techniques for decomposing distributed algorithms, based on levels of abstraction and parallel composition of interacting components.
This paper describes an experiment in modeling and analyzing security protocols, using I/O automata [14, 12] and the usual techniques that go along with them-a combination of invariant assertions, simulation relations, and compositional reasoning using traces. The aim of the experiment is to explore how these methods can help in decomposing the task of reasoning about security protocols. This model and these methods have been used successfully for decomposing the reasoning about many standard distributed algorithms (see, e.g., [12, 16, 13] ), and about several distributed system designs (see, e.g., [6, 7, 9, 10] ), so it is worth discovering what they can do for security protocols.
The experiment involves combining simple shared-key communication and key distribution protocols to implement private communication. In the case we describe in detail here, simple Diffie-Hellman key distribution [4] is used, the protocols tolerate only passive eavesdroppers, and only safety properties are considered. In another case in progress, discussed briefly here, the more complex Diffie-OorschotWeiner key distribution protocol [5] , which tolerates adversaries that can intrude more actively, is studied. Later work will include liveness guarantees, formulated in terms of timing properties.
Our main guideline in studying these protocols is to try to decompose the reasoning as much as possible, identifying sub-problems that can be treated separately. (Although the examples in this paper are simple enough to be understood informally, we believe that understanding how best to decompose them is a good first step toward understanding how to decompose more complex examples.) The handling of each piece should be appropriately abstract. For example, in discussing protocol issues, cryptosystem computability issues should be summarized by assumptions saying that certain values are not "easily computable" from others; number-theoretic arguments about why these values are not (likely to be) easily computable should be treated at a lower level, as mechanisms to achieve the more abstract non-computability guarantees. Probabilistic issues should be treated separately, as far as possible. After dividing up the problems in this way, we expect that the main benefit of the I/O automaton-based methods will be in clarifying the distributed algorithm issues. Cryptosystem issues, for example, may be better treated by other means, for example, the inductive techniques of Paulson [15] . However, a general framework should provide a rigorous way of combining the different types of issues.
In treating the distributed algorithms themselves, we similarly try to decompose them as much as possible. The most obvious form of decomposition involves treating the two sub-protocols separately, then trying to paste them together using general theorems about automaton composition. Another form involves giving very high level automaton specifications for services, giving separate descriptions of implementing algorithms, and showing, by means of simulation relations, that the algorithms implement the services. Still another form involves first studying a protocol using a natural, simple cryptosystem, and later trying to show that its correctness properties extend to modified versions that use more elaborate cryptosystems. And still another form of decomposition involves combining adversaries that interact with separate protocols into a single "colluding" unit.
Because I/O automata are composed by means of shared actions, and because we are considering only safety properties in this paper, it is natural to describe external behavior of automata in terms of sets of traces (i.e., sequences of external actions). The simple trace semantics yields simple and powerful projection and pasting theorems (see, e.g., [12] , p. 211), for the behavior of compositions of automata. However, in order to enable compositional reasoning about particular kinds of properties, the traces must contain all the information relevant for those properties. For example, in treating fault-tolerance properties such as wait-free termination and f-failure termination compositionally, in terms of traces, it is convenient to allow the traces to contain special fail input actions that signal the occurrence of failure events (see, e.g., [12, 13] ). Sometimes it is convenient to consider different strengths of failure actions (e.g., the good, bad, and ugly failure actions in [7] ). Also, in order to treat timing properties compositionally, it is useful to introduce timing information into the traces.
In the case of security protocols, important properties involve lack of knowledge. To treat this compositionally, one should include something about knowledge in the traces.
Section 24 shows what is involved in moving from a description of each of the two individual protocols in terms of its own natural cryptosystem to a description in terms of a common, richer cryptosystem. For example, the shared key protocol is initially analyzed in terms of abstract, unstructured keys taken from a simple "shared-key cryptosystem". However, when one combines this protocol with DiffieHellman, it is necessary to consider a version that uses structured keys, taken from a richer "structured-key cryptosystem".
Section 27 puts the pieces together, to get an implementation of private communication that uses shared-key communication with Diffie-Hellman key distribution. Most of this is accomplished automatically from the general projection and pasting theorems for I/O automata; special arguments must be made for combining the insecure channels used in the two protocols, and for combining the two adversaries into one. Section 30 gives a final discussion. Because of limited space, most of the proofs have been omitted from this version; the rest will appear in a technical report [].
Related work: Of the formal work on modeling and analyzing cryptographic protocols, the efforts that seem closest in spirit to ours are those of Abadi and of Paulson. Abadi has developed a framework for formal study of composable security protocols [2, 1] , and Paulson has developed inductive reasoning methods, which appear valuable both for proving assertions and for determining cryptosystem reachability relationships [15] . Others have stated and proved invariant assertions for security protocols, though we do not know of other work on simulation relations for such protocols. We also do not know about other work using traces with explicit learn and reveal actions as an approach to compositional reasoning about security protocols. Wing and Cheiner are currently modeling security protocols using the approach of this paper, including verifying assertions using the PVS theorem prover.
Mathematical Preliminaries
denotes the empty string. We use I/O automata as defined in [12] . Since we do not deal with liveness in this paper, the tasks are irrelevant. If A and B are I/O automata with the same external signature, then we say that A implements B provided that every trace of A is also a trace of B.
Invariants and simulation relations are defined, for example, in [12] .
Data Model
This section gives a basic model for the data types used in the protocols.
Cryptosystems
A cryptosystem signature S consists of: 
EN S FN S , a set of easy function names.
A constant name is a function name f such that domain S f = . Let CN S FN S denote the set of constant names of C. We omit the subscript S where no confusion seems likely. A cryptosystem C consists of:
A cryptosystem signature sig C . We write TN C as shorthand for TN sig C , etc. set C , a mapping from TN C to disjoint sets. fun C , a mapping from FN C to functions; We require that if domain C f = t 1 ; : : : ; t k and range C f = t then fun C f : set C t 1 set C t k ! set C t.
We write set C for S t2TN C set C t. We omit the subscript C where no confusion seems likely. If X f yg set C , we say that y is easily reachable from X in C provided that y is obtainable starting from elements of X, by applying only functions denoted by function names in EN C .
Term Cryptosystems
If S is a cryptosystem signature, then the terms of S, and their types, are defined recursively, as follows: We use the notation R C for the congruence relation R of C. If e 2 Terms C , then we write e C for the equivalence class of e with respect to R C . Also, if E Terms C then we write E C for the set of equivalence classes e C for e 2 E.
Cryptosystem Examples
In this subsection we give the cryptosystems used later in the paper. The first kind of cryptosystem, a shared-key cryptosystem, is used in shared key communication. The second kind, a base-exponent cryptosystem, is used in the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The third kind, a structured-key cryptosystem, is essentially a combination of the two others. It is used when the two protocols are combined.
Shared-key cryptosystems
A shared-key cryptosystem C is a term cryptosystem. The signature S = sig C is defined as follows. TN S consists of two type names: "M " for messages and "K" for keys. FN S consists of: enc, with domainenc = "M "; "K" and rangeenc = "M ". dec, with domaindec = "M "; "K" and rangedec = "M ". 
Specifically, we want the smallest congruence relation on Terms S that equates all terms that are related by the given equations.
Base-exponent cryptosystems
A base-exponent cryptosystem C is a term cryptosystem in which, letting S = sig C : TN S consists of two type names, "B" for bases and "X" for exponents. FN S consists of: exp, with domainexp = "B"; "X" and rangeexp = "B".
BConst S , a set of base constant names, with rangeb = "B" for all b 2 BConst S .
XConst1 S and XConst2 S , two disjoint sets of exponent constant names, with domainx = and rangex = "X" for all x 2 XConst1 S XConst2 S . EN S = fexpg BConst S . The relation R is defined by means of all equations of the form:
expexpb; x; y = expexpb; y; x , where b; x; y 2 Terms S , typeb = "B", typex = typey = "X".
Define B2 S to be the set of all terms of the form expexpb; x; y , where b 2 BConst S , x 2 XConst1 S and y 2 XConst2 S . An augmented base-exponent cryptosystem is a base-exponent cryptosystem together with a distinguished element b0 S of BConst S .
Structured-key cryptosystems
A structured-key cryptosystem is a combination of a sharedkey cryptosystem and a base-exponent cryptosystem, where certain terms of the base-exponent cryptosystem are identified with the keys. A structured-key cryptosystem C is a term cryptosystem in which, letting S = sig C : TN S consists of the type names "M ", "B", and "X". FN S consists of: enc, with domainenc = "M "; "B" and rangeenc = "M ". dec, with domaindec = "M "; "B" and rangedec = "M ".
exp, with domainexp = "B"; "X" and rangeexp = "B". expexpb; x; y = expexpb; y; x , where b; x; y 2 Terms S , typeb = "B", typex = typey = "X".
Once again, we write B2 S for the set of terms of the form expexpb; x; y , where b 2 BConst S , x 2 XConst1 S , and y 2 XConst2 S . An augmented structured-key cryptosystem is a structured-key cryptosystem together with a distinguished element b0 S of BConst S .
Some Generally-Useful Automata
In this section, we give automaton models for some system components that will appear in many settings: environments for security services, insecure channels, and eavesdroppers. They are presented in a parameterized fashion so that they can be used in different contexts. We model these components as automata (rather than, e.g., by trace properties) for uniformity with the way we will model algorithms and system specs, and because this makes it possible to reason about them assertionally.
Environment Automata
Here we assume that U is a universal set of data values, A is an arbitrary finite set of adversary ports, that is, locations where information can be communicated to the adversary, and N U. The environment automaton EnvU; A; N models any entities other than the channels from which an eavesdropper may learn information. It says that the environment is capable of communicating elements of U at any adversary port a 2 A, but in fact does not communicate any elements of N. EnvU; A; N :
Signature:
Input: None Output:
learnua, u 2 U, a 2 A
States:

No variables
Transitions:
Insecure Channel Automata
Here we assume that U is a universal set of data values, P is an arbitrary finite set of client ports, and A is an arbitrary finite set of adversary ports. The insecure channel admits send and receive actions for all elements of U and also has eavesdrop output actions, by which information in transit passes to an outsider. The insecure channel allows any message in transit to be communicated to an outsider.
IC U; P; A:
Signature:
Input:
IC-sendup;q, u 2 U, p;q 2 P, p 6 = q Output:
IC-receiveup;q, u 2 U, p; q 2 P, p 6 = q eavesdropup;q;a, u 2 U, p;q 2 P, p 6 = q, a 2 A
States:
for every p;q 2 P, p 6 = q: bu er p; q, a multiset of U, initially empty
Transitions:
IC-sendup;q EveC; P ; A :
Signature:
eavesdropup;q;a, u 2 set C , p;q 2 P, p 6 = q, a 2 A learnua, u 2 set C , a 2 A has := has f ug
The Services
In this section, we describe the two services that are implemented by the protocols in this paper. They are described as automata, which is convenient for assertional reasoning. The use of input and output actions provides convenient ways of composing these automata with others, and of describing what is preserved by implementation relationships. For simplicity, we write these specifications to describe only safety properties, although the same methods can be used to handle liveness properties, formulated as time bounds (see, e.g., [11, 12] ).
Private Communication
This section contains a specification of the problem of achieving private communication among the members of a finite collection P of clients. The specification expresses three properties: (1) only messages that are sent are delivered, (2) messages are delivered at most once each, and (3) none of the messages is revealed by an "adversary". We describe the problem using a high-level I/O automaton specification PC U; P; M; A, where U is a universal set of data values, P is an arbitrary finite set of client ports, M U is a set of messages, and A is an arbitrary finite set of adversary ports. This specification does not mention distribution or keys; these aspects will appear in implementations of this specification, but not in the specification itself. The specification simply describes the desired properties, as an abstract machine. As usual for automaton specifications, the properties, listed separately above, are intermingled in one description.
PC U; P; M; A:
Signature:
PC-sendmp;q, m 2 M, p;q 2 P, p 6 = q Output:
PC-receiveup;q, u 2 U, p;q 2 P, p 6 = q reveal ua, u 2 U, a 2 A
States:
for every pair p;q 2 P, p 6 = q: bu er p; q, a multiset of M 
none The first two properties listed above, which amount to atmost-once delivery of messages that were actually sent, are expressed by the transition definitions for PC-send and PC-receive. The third property, privacy, is expressed by the constraint for reveal.
Key Distribution
This is a drastically simplified key distribution service, which distributes a single key to several participants. We do not model requests for the keys, but assume that the service generates the key spontaneously. The simplified key distribution problem is specified by the automaton KDU;P;K;A, where U is a universal set of data values, P is an arbitrary finite set of client ports, K U is a set of keys, and A is a finite set of adversary ports.
KDU;P;K;A: 
Implementing Private Communication using Shared Keys
This section describes a straightforward shared-key communication protocol. The protocol simply uses a shared key, obtained from a key distribution service, to encode and decode messages. Throughout the section, we assume that C is a shared-key cryptosystem, P is a set (of clients) with at least 2 elements, and A is a nonempty finite set (of adversaries).
The Encoder and Decoder
We define parameterized encoder and decoder automata, parameterized by the shared-key cryptosystem C, the set P of clients, and elements p; q 2 P, p 6 = q. Note that, in the code for IC-sendu, we are using the abbreviation enc for fun C enc -that is, we are suppressing mention of the particular cryptosystem C. EncC DecC; P p;q , where p; q 2 P, p 6 = q :
Signature:
IC-receiveup;q, u 2 set C grantuq, u 2 set C Output:
PC-receiveup;q, u 2 set C
States:
bu er, a multiset of elements of set C "M ", initially empty shared-key 2 KConst C f?g, initially ?
IC-receiveup;q 
The Complete Implementation
In the rest of this section, we assume: U = set C ; M = MConst C ; K = KConst C ; N = M K; U 0 is an arbitrary set with K U 0 ; A 0 is an arbitrary set, disjoint from
A.
The implementation consists of encoder and decoder components, an insecure channel, eavesdropper and environment, plus a key distribution service. More precisely, the implementation, S 1 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 , is obtained by composing the following automata and then hiding certain actions.
EncC; P p;q , DecC; P p;q , p; q 2 P , p 6 = q. IC U; P; A, EveC; P ; A , Env U; A; N. KDU 0 ; P ; K ; A 0 , a key distribution service.
In this system, the eavesdropper Eve does not acquire any information directly from the KD component. Later, in Section 27, we combine this eavesdropper with another that arises in the key distribution service implementation.
To get S 1 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 , we hide the following actions in the composition just defined: eavesdrop p;q;a , p; q 2 P, a 2 A; IC-send p;q , IC-receive p;q , p; q 2 P ; grant p , p 2 P; learn a , a 2 A; reveal a , a 2 A 0 . We sometimes omit explicit mention of parameters of S 1 , or of other systems and components, when we think that confusion is unlikely. Figure 1 contains an interaction diagram for S 1 .
Our system model says that the eavesdropper learns no elements of N = M K from outside sources. That choice of N is fine for this protocol, but we do not now have a general prescription for how to choose "good" sets N for all protocols. ("Good" here means that the set should have a simple definition, should be large enough to include all values that the adversary could use to break the protocol, and should be small enough to exclude values produced by other protocols with which the given protocol is to be composed.)
Invariants
In system S 1 , we use Enc p;q , Dec p;q , IC , Eve, and KD as "handles" to help in naming state variables in the composed state. This handle naming device for state variables is taken from Vaziri's work [17] . The first invariant says that the keys granted by the key distribution service are consistent. The proofs of the first two of these invariants are straightforward inductive arguments. In some of the steps (e.g., the IC-send steps in Part 1 of Lemma 17.2), facts about the cryptosystem are used (in this case, some inequivalence facts for terms). The third invariant follows from the second.
Implementation Proof
We show that S 1 implements PC U; P; M; A, using a simulation relation from S 1 to PC U; P; M; A. The relation F is defined by saying that s; t 2 F provided that the following condition holds:
For each p; q 2 P , p 6 = q, t:bu erp; q is the multiset union of three multisets, A 1 ; A 2 ; A 3 , of U, where: That is, each high-level multiset of messages in transit is obtained from the messages in the buffers at the encoder and decoder, plus those in transit in the low-level insecure channels. The messages in the insecure channels and in the decoder buffer must be decoded for the correspondence.
Theorem 18.1 F is a simulation relation.
Proof: By standard assertional methods for proving simulations, see, e.g., [12] , p. 225. The invariants of the preceding section are used here. 
Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution Protocol
This section describes the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol. Throughout the section, we assume C is an augmented base-exponent cryptosystem, P = fp1; p 2g, and A is a nonempty set.
The Endpoint Automata
We define two symmetric automata, for the two elements of P. DH C; P p1 :
Signature:
IC-receiveb p2;p1 , b 2 set C "B"
Output:
IC-sendb p1;p2 , b 2 set C "B" grantb p1 , b 2 set C "B"
Internal:
choose-exp p1
States:
chosen-exp 2 XConst1 C f?g, initially ?
base-sent, a Boolean, initially false rcvd-base 2 set C "B" f?g, initially ?
granted , a Boolean, initially false granted := true
The automaton for p2 is the same, but interchanges uses of p1 and p2, and likewise of XConst1 and XConst2 .
The Complete Implementation
In the rest of this section, we assume: U = set C ; K = B2 C ; X = XConst1 C XConst2 C ; N = K X.
The implementation consists of two endpoint automata, an insecure channel, an eavesdropper and an environment.
Specifically, implementation S 2 C; P ; A is the composition of the following automata, with certain actions hidden: DH C; P p , p 2 P , endpoint automata. IC U; P; A, EveC; P ; A , EnvU; A; N.
To get S 2 C; P ; A , we hide: eavesdrop p;q;a , p; q 2 P, p 6 = q, a 2 A; IC-send p;q , IC-receive p;q , p; q 2 P , p 6 = q; learn a , a 2 A. 
Invariants
In system S 2 , we use DH p for p 2 P, IC 
Implementation Proof
We show that S 2 implements KDU;P;K;A using a simulation relation. The relation F is defined by saying that 
Algorithms Using Structured-Key Cryptosystems
In this section, we extend the implementations of private communication and of key distribution so that they use a structured-key cryptosystem, in place of a shared key cryptosystem or base-exponent cryptosystem. For the rest of the paper, fix C to be any augmented structured-key cryptosystem.
Private Communication
Notation and assumptions
We define a shared-key cryptosystem C 0 directly from C, by saying that MConst C 0 = MConst C and KConst C 0 = B2 C .
That is, we use the B2 terms in C as "names" for keys in C 0 . In this subsection, we assume: P is an arbitrary set with at least 2 elements; A is an arbitrary set; U = set C ; M = MConst C ; K = B2 C ; X = XConst1 C XConst2 C . Also, W is the set of all elements w 2 set C "M " that can be obtained as follows: In cryptosystem C, w is obtained from an element m 2 set C 0 "M " by applying some number of enc operations with second arguments in set C B 00 , K. (That is, w is obtained by "wrapping" the element.) Furthermore, N = W K X; U 0 = U = set C ; A 0 is an arbitrary set, disjoint from A.
The most interesting part of this is the definition of W , which is intended to designate the elements of type "M " that are to be avoided. Set W must be sufficiently large to include all elements of type "M " that could help to compute elements that are supposed to remain unknown. But W must be sufficiently small to exclude elements that might be communicated in other protocols with which the present protocol is going to be composed. And, W must be defined reasonably simply. Coming up with a good choice of W seems at this point to be something of an art, similar to coming up with a good invariant. The choice we have made above is one of several possibilities. We think it looks a little messy, especially because it does not fall into a formalized style that might suggest how similar definitions might be made for more complicated protocols. A simpler choice that would work for this paper would be W = set C "M ", but that seems to be ruling out more than would be ideal. Another choice would be a smaller W, for instance the set of elements of U that are easily reachable from M set C B 00 ,K in C. We leave this for later work.
New encoder and decoder automata
The formal definitions of Enc3 and Dec3 are nearly identical to those of Enc and Dec. The difference is that the new automata use elements of type "B" in place of KConst. Of course, the parameters have new meanings, as defined just above.
New implementation
We define S 3 to be the algorithm from Section 14, but implemented using the structured-key cryptosystem C rather than a shared key cryptosystem. That is, S 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 is the composition of the following automata, with some actions hidden: Enc3 C; P p;q and Dec3 C; P p;q , p; q 2 P, p 6 = q. IC U; P; A, EveC; P ; A , Env U; A; N. KDU 0 ; P ; K ; A 0 .
To get S 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 , we hide: eavesdrop p;q;a , p; q 2 P, a 2 A; IC-send p;q , IC-receive p;q , p; q 2 P; grant p , p 2 P; learn a , a 2 A; reveal a , a 2 A 0 . We want to show that this system implements PC U; P; M; A. Part 2 of invariant 25.2 has a somewhat different style from those we have used so far. It basically says that if a "wrapped version" of an element of set C 0 "M " is in has, then the actual element of set C 0 "M " must also be there.
Note that we did not give any invariants here saying that K elements or M elements do not appear in Eve:has, as we did in Section 17. This is because (in the interests of decomposition) we are trying to avoid proving facts that have already been proved for the more abstract version of the algorithm. Instead, we are trying to rely on the simulation relation, described in the next subsection, to give such facts.
Implementation proof
We prove the correctness of S 3 as a consequence of that of the analogous system S 1 C 0 ; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 . By our previous result about S 1 , Theorem 18.2: Lemma 25.3 S 1 C 0 ; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 implements PC set C 0 ; P ; M ; A .
In order to prove correctness of S 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 ,
we would like to demonstrate a simulation relationship from S 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 to S 1 C 0 ; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 . To do this, we first make the interfaces consistent, by defining S 0 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 from S 3 by hiding the actions revealu a , u 2 U , set C 0 .
Lemma 25. 4 If is a trace of S 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 then with all revealu actions removed, u 2 U,set C 0 , is a trace of S 0 3 C 0 ; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 . Now we define the relation F from S 0 3 C; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 to S 1 C 0 ; P ; A ; U 0 ; A 0 : s; t 2 F provided: The proofs of the results in this and the next subsection deal with specific cryptosystems. It would be interesting to extract general theorems that could be applied to get such results. Such theorems would involve some kind of notion of "embedding" of one cryptosystem in another, and statements articulating when a protocol that works with a cryptosystem also works with any cryptosystem in which that cryptosystem is embedded.
Key Distribution
Notation and assumptions
We define an augmented base-exponent cryptosystem C 0 directly from C, by saying BConst C 0 = BConst C , XConst1 C 0 = XConst1 C , XConst2 C 0 = XConst2 C , and b0 C 0 = b0 C . In this subsection, we assume: P = fp1; p 2g;
A is an arbitrary set; U = set C ; K = B2 C ; X = XConst1 C XConst2 C ; N = K X.
New implementation
The new endpoint automata are syntactically the same as the old endpoint automata. The only difference is that the subscript C now refers to a structured-key cryptosystem. We define S 4 to be the algorithm from Section 19, but implemented using the structured-key cryptosystem C rather than a base-exponent cryptosystem. That is, S 4 C; P ; A is the composition of the following automata, with some actions hidden: DH C; P p , p 2 P. IC U; P; A, EveC; P ; A , Env U; A; N.
To get S 4 C; P ; A , we hide: eavesdrop p;q;a , p; q 2 P, a 2 A; IC-send p;q , IC-receive p;q , p; q 2 P; learn a , a 2 A. We want to show that this system implements KDU;P;K;A.
We prove the correctness of S 4 as a consequence of that of the analogous system S 2 C 0 ; P ; A . By our previous result about S 2 , Theorem 23. Theorem 26.6 S 4 C; P ; A implements KDU;P;K;A.
Putting the Pieces Together
Now we describe how to put the previous results together, to get an implementation of private communication that uses the shared-key communication protocol in combination with the Diffie-Hellman key distribution service. The first step combines the two protocols, but still keeps the insecure channels, eavesdroppers, and environments for the two algorithms separate. The second step combine the two channels into one and likewise for the eavesdroppers and the environments.
Composing Diffie-Hellman and SharedKey Communication to get Private Communication
Recall that we have already fixed C to be an augmented structured-key cryptosystem. We now fix, for the rest of the paper: U = set C ; P = fp1; p 2g; P 0 = fp1 0 ; p 2 0 g;
A is an arbitrary set; M = MConst C ; K = B2 C ; X = XConst1 C XConst2 C ; W is the set of elements of set C "M " that can be obtained from set C 0 "M " set C B 00 , K in C using enc; N = W K X; A 0 is an arbitrary set, disjoint from A. 
Merging Channels, Adversaries, and Environments
The final implementation, S 6 , is obtained from S 5 by merging the two separate insecure channels into one, and likewise for the two adversaries and the two environments. To do this, and yet keep the same interfaces, we extend the definitions of IC and Eve to allow two types of ports, primed and unprimed. Specifically, S 6 consists of: Enc3 C; P p;q , Dec3 C; P p;q , p; q 2 P, p 6 = q. DH5 p , p 2 P. Here, the extended IC is the same as IC U; P P 0 ; A A 0 but only has actions with subscripts p; q; a where either p; q 2 P, a 2 A or p; q 2 P 0 , a 2 A 0 . Similarly for the extended Eve. Also, S 6 hides all actions except for the PC-send, PC-receive, and reveal a actions for a 2 A.
The combined eavesdropper eavesdrops and learns on all adversary ports in A A 0 , and can use all this information in calculating its has information, which resides in a single state component. The combined environment avoids communicating any information in N N 0 . We claim that S 6 implements S 5 , which implies that S 6 implements PC U; P; M; A. To prove this result, we define S 7 , which is just like S 5 except that it combines the eavesdroppers, but not the channels or environments.
Lemma 29.1 S 7 implements S 5 .
The essence of this lemma is that information that an eavesdropper can acquire in either protocol does not upset the requirements of the other protocol. It would be nice to show that EveC; P ; A ; P 0 ; A 0 implements EveC; P ; A EveC; P 0 ; A 0 . But this is not quite correct: the implementation relationship requires assumptions about the contexts in which the eavesdroppers run, (and also, the relationship does not preserve the learn actions). So we just prove an implementation relationship for the eavesdroppers in their contexts. However, it is clear that the argument uses only minimal information about the particular contexts, namely, what kind of information they can contribute in eavesdrop and learn actions; it should be possible to extract a general lemma stating these restrictions on contexts explicitly.
Proof:
We use a simulation relation F from S 7 to S 5 defined so that s; t 2 F exactly if:
1. Everything except for has components is the same in s and t.
2. If u 2 s:has then u is easily reachable from t:EveC; P ; A :has U , N in C.
Discussion
In this paper, we have modeled and analyzed the combination of simple shared key communication with DiffieHellman key distribution, in the presence of an eavesdropper adversary. Although this example is very simple, many kinds of decomposition are evident in its presentation. Understanding these in a simple context is a prerequisite for extending them to more complicated protocols.
We believe that this type of presentation is useful in clarifying protocol issues. It also helps in separating the protocol issues from other issues, such as cryptosystem reachability issues, which can be treated separately. It appears possible to decompose the presentation in this paper even more, for example, by defining a notion of embeddings of cryptosystems and obtaining the results of Section 24 as consequences of such theorems.
In work in progress, we are extending these ideas to more complex protocols like that of Diffie, Oorschot, and Weiner [5] , which tolerate more active adversaries. So far, it appears that the modeling/analysis ideas of this paper scale well to the more complicated examples. Some issues that arise in modeling the protocol of [5] are: The cryptosystems are more complicated, so more complicated arguments need to be made about reachability; for example, the analogues of the set W defined in Section 25.0.4 become more complicated. Also, because the adversary has more active control of the communication system, it is convenient to combine them into a single automaton model. (The has component of that automaton is now used to decide what may be delivered to the client, as well as what may be revealed.) Also, the correctness guarantees are weaker-for instance, repeated deliveries of the same message, and deliveries to the wrong recipient, are possible. A more complicated key distribution service specification will also be needed, including key requests and granting of multiple keys.
The work of this paper has not mentioned liveness properties. For the simple case of this paper, with a passive eavesdropper, liveness claims are certainly possible. They can be incorporated easily into the model in the form of time bounds, and proved using the usual assertional methods for timing analysis, such as those appearing in [3, 11] . For more active adversaries, more sophisticated algorithms can also guarantee liveness properties, which could also be formulated as time bounds and proved similarly.
Another interesting research direction is the modular introduction of probabilistic considerations. We expect that it is possible to accomplish a great deal at a high level of abstraction, by simply assuming that certain low probability "bad" events do not occur. The low probability bad events could then be introduced separately, with general theorems used to limit their impact on system behavior. But such general theorems remain to be developed.
